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anomalous. I believe that this idea can be reconciled with Kotarbiński who 
explained the term ‘free’, as it occurs in ‘free impulse’, in the following way:
(…) by freedom we understand here the characteristics of deliberate behavior well 
known to the readers from their own experience, and not some indeterministic 
freedom of actions conceived as their independence on causes (Treatise: p. 32).21
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As a starting point I assume that Practical Philosophy includes Political 
Philosophy and Normative Social Philosophy. Moreover, I take it that 
Transcendental-Pragmatics, as a practical philosophy, has “temperature”. 
(Anyone who has met Karl-Otto Apel or Jürgen Habermas would understand.1)
So, for those working in transcendental-pragmatics, what is at stake?  
Briefly stated, those doing transcendental-pragmatics have a mission: A calling 
to cope with civilizational crises, as a normative challenge, and a calling to cope 
with modernity, conceived in terms of science-based and institutionally 
differentiated societies, with various ‘cognitive interests’, not merely 
instrumental rationality, but also interpretive and liberating reasoning, conceived 
as discursive reasoning. 
In short, I assume that their main concern is discursive enlightenment, i.e., 
a modern society moderated and normatively justified by self-reflective and 
discursive reasoning. That’s what really matters for philosophers engaged in 
transcendental-pragmatics and discursive reasoning. 
1 Cf. e.g. APEL [1998] and [2003], and HABERMAS [2001], [2004], [2005], [2012].
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To elucidate this point, I shall situate transcendental-pragmatics historically, 
within changing intellectual and institutional constellations. 
1. The post-war constellation and the role of transcendental
pragmatics
I start with the following suggestion: Transcendental-pragmatics should be 
conceived as a philosophical and existential response to skepticism and 
civilizational crises. Hence, it is no accident that transcendental-pragmatics 
emerged after the Second World War, nor that it primarily emerged in Germany 
and not in the victorious Anglophone world.2
This is my first point: the general intellectual constellation in the post-war 
period, when transcendental-pragmatics gradually emerged, can be characterized 
by challenges from three angles:  
(i) There was a need to respond to the War and the Nazi period,3 to cope with 
the civilizational damages. In this situation, transcendental-pragmatics 
represented an attempt to formulate a post-skeptical response to the question of 
how to justify universally valid principles and practices for a civilized society.  
Moreover, broadly speaking there were two dominant intellectual positions in 
this post-war period, on the one hand (ii) existentialism, advocating normative 
decisionism4 (and cognitive relativism), and on the other hand (iii) positivism,
defending normative decisionism and emotionalism (and epistemic scientism). 
Hence, transcendental-pragmatics had clearly recognizable adversaries in these 
two philosophical positions, existentialism and positivism. 
Intellectually and politically, the emerging transcendental-pragmatics could thus 
be seen as located within a triangular constellation, with the challenges of war 
experiences as the overall background and with existentialism and positivism as 
two competing intellectual positions on each side.  
2 For this reason, transcendental-pragmatics makes sense primarily for those who are faced with 
these challenges. Those who remain unconcerned and self-content without questioning their own 
foundations will hardly grasp the intellectual importance and existential impact of transcendental-
pragmatics. Cf. the difference in early life experiences for Richard Rorty and for Karl-Otto Apel. 
During WWII, Rorty was peacefully looking for wild orchids in the US, while Apel was exposed 
to the breakdown of civilzation on the Eastern Front (see RORTY [1999], pp. 6–7). The same 
holds true for pseudo-skeptical intellectuals who refuse to pursue the skeptical challenge to the 
bitter end; a critique of this attitude, see SKIRBEKK [1958].
3 See APEL [1988b].
4 At least in its popular versions. Moreover, the decisionism in early Heidegger, cf. the politically 
ambiguous term “resoluteness” (Entschlossenheit) in Sein und Zeit [1927].
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Add to this that the first generation of the Frankfurt school (T. W. Adorno and 
M. Horkheimer) relied heavily on a dichotomy of power-infected instrumental 
reason on the one hand, and liberating aesthetics on the other, with a similar 
neglect of argumentative and liberating reasoning as in Heideggerian 
existentialism. Against both these positions (Heidegger and Adorno/ 
Horkheimer), and also against logical positivism (as in the Vienna School), 
a reconsideration of various kinds of rationality became an urgent task for the 
emerging transcendental-pragmatics. Thus, a discursive and reflective notion of 
rationality was elaborated and defended by those who tended toward 
transcendental-pragmatics (in the first place, Apel and Habermas), and at the 
same time the notion of rationality was being differentiated according to 
different sciences and different basic acts.5
2.Inherent discussions and challenges
There were inherent discussions and challenges.6 Just a few reminders 
concerning the notion of truth: At the point of departure, we have the 
relationship between justification and truth. Justification “can be lost”, it may 
change by “time and space” and by the persons involved, and justification is 
seen as gradual, as more or less well established, whereas truth “cannot be lost”, 
being independent of time and space and of the persons holding it.  
Hence, identifying truth with justification renders truth relative.7 But, on the 
other hand, if one defines truth and justification as radically different, it is hard 
to see how truth could ever be reached by humans, because, as fallible beings, 
we depend on investigation and discussion, that is, on processes of justification.  
The transcendental-pragmatic response to this dilemma consists in an attempt to 
conceive the notion of truth as an “idealization” in a transcendental-pragmatic 
sense, that is, as an unavoidably presupposed regulative idea.8 However, 
discussions within and around the community of transcendental-pragmatic 
5 Cf. Habermas on different “cognitive interests”, and Apel/Kettner on “die eine Vernunft und die 
vielen Rationalitäten”.
6 The discussions within transcendental pragmatics are related to extensive contemporary 
discussions. Here are some references, ordered alphabetically: AUSTIN [1975], BAILEY [2013], 
BENHABIB [2009], BRUMLIK [1986], BRUNE [2003], GRONKE [2003], HELLESNES 
[2002a] and [2002b], JAKOBSEN [2012], KELLERWESSEL et al. (eds) [2005], NIQUET 
[1993], RAWLS [1993], [1995], RYLE [1945], SEARLE [1969], SKJERVHEIM [1996], 
STRAWSON [1966], WELLMER [2004], [2007], WERNER [2003], WITTGENSTEIN [1953], 
YU [2006].  
7 Cf. Richard Rorty.
8 Not ”idealization” in the sense of “idealized models” as in economics or physics.
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philosophers reveal that this notion of truth remains controversial.9 Briefly, here 
is a reminder of some main points in that respect:  
Karl-Otto Apel conceives of the notion of truth as a transcendental-pragmatic
precondition in terms of an “ultimate opinion” of an ideal community of 
researchers and discussants “in the long run”, and hence as a speech-act inherent 
“regulative idea”, unavoidably presupposed in our interaction, and at the same 
time indicating the direction of our search for truth, but never fully realizable in 
real life and in human history.  
This Apelian notion of truth as “ideal consensus” was attacked from various angles, 
for instance by Albrecht Wellmer who presented various counterarguments:10
(i) According to Wellmer, Apel’s notion of an “ideal consensus” in 
terms of an “ultimate opinion” entails a “God’s eye” view, contrary to Apel’s 
own intention. It entails a metaphysical rest, despite Apel’s claim of overcoming 
theoretical metaphysics by speech-act inherent transcendental arguments.  
(ii) Moreover, due to our human finitude, there will always be a plurality 
of linguistic approaches and thus (Wellmer says) a “fight about truth”,11 and 
hence there can be no final consensus.  
(iii) The notion of an ideal consensus is therefore conceptually 
meaningless: It presupposes the end of history, the end of human conditions, and 
thus it does not make sense as a goal for human efforts. More specifically, it 
presupposes, according to Wellmer, complete transparency, absolute knowledge, 
and moral perfection – which makes the notion meaningless.12
The latter claim13 is explicitly repudiated by Apel, adding that such a claim 
would indeed have been absurd. However, to my mind, a problem remains in 
Apel's own position due to the unavoidable pluralism of languages in most 
cases; not necessarily as a “fight” between conceptual perspectives (as Wellmer 
says), but as a linguistic and conceptual pluralism, (e.g.) due to the 
differentiation of a manifold of discipline-inherent conceptions and languages in 
modern science-based societies.  
9 Some references, ordered alphabetically: APEL [1967], [1973], [1979], [1988a], [2001], [2003], 
[2011], BÖHLER [2003], [2013], BÖHLER et al. (eds) [1987], [2003], DORSCHEL et al. (eds)
[1993], HABERMAS [1983], [1984], [1991], [1992], [1999], [2000], [2003], KETTNER [1993], 
KEUTH [1993], KUHLMANN [1982], [1986], [1992], KUHLMANN et al.(eds) [1982], ÖFSTI 
[1994], [2003], RÄHME [2003], [2007], RORTY [1989], [2000], SKIRBEKK [1982], [1997], 
[2011], TRANØY [1976], WELLMER [1986], [2003].
10 WELLMER [2003].
11 Streit um die Wahrheit, ibid.
12 WELLMER [1993], p. 162, where he says that Apel presupposes vollkommene Transparenz, 
absolutes Wissen, and moralische Vollkommenheit.
13 Ibid., p. 153.
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Moreover, what about Wellmer’s own position?  Basically, Wellmer refers to 
what he sees as a grammatical point, namely a switch of perspectives between 
“my beliefs” and “the beliefs of others”,14 the former perceived as true, that is, 
for me here and now, and the latter conceived as fallible.  
To my mind, the strength of Wellmer's point lies in his emphasis on the 
unavoidability of truth-claims here-and-now, grammatically in the first-person 
indicative mood.15 But there are questions to be raised (as Apel was quick to 
point out), for instance, whether Wellmer's own claim about a grammatically 
founded epistemic switch should be conceived as a universal validity-claim, and 
thereby as a claim to consensus under ideal conditions, despite linguistic 
pluralism and human finitude.  
Let me also recall some further objections to Wellmer.16 A distinction between 
“my beliefs” (in the first-person indicative) and “the beliefs of others” (in 
a third-person perspective) should not be construed as a strict dichotomy. There 
are evidently interconnections between the two perspectives, in the sense that 
“my beliefs” are those beliefs that have been established and tried out in 
interaction with other persons. Moreover, even though I take “my beliefs” here-
and-now to be true, from experience I am at the same time reflectively aware of 
my own fallibilism. I know I am fallible; and that is exactly the reason why 
I recognize an urge to go further, to be open to trying out my present opinions by 
new investigations and renewed argumentations, possibly with new conceptual 
and disciplinary perspectives.17 But then we are underway, if not towards 
perfection, at least away from what can be recognized as less reasonable 
opinions – in short, a gradualist meliorism,18 as a transcendental-pragmatic 
precondition, and thus as a “constitutive regulative idea”. 
14 Habermas has a similar point (as Wellmer), emphasizing the switches between (i) taking 
something to be true and (ii) questioning something in further research (HABERMAS [1999]). But 
in Habermas this appears as a sociological point about scientific and scholarly research, not as 
a self-referential (transcendental-pragmatic) point – and that is a decisive difference. 
15 Wellmer defends the view that the notion of truth is related to self-reference, but also that 
fallibilism may take different forms and degrees. Those are good points. But he does not delineate 
the melioristic, the dynamic drive toward improvement, away from that which is seen as less good 
reasons. Hence he does not talk about “regulative ideas”, which he interprets as in Apel, and not 
melioristically.
16 Here we refer to WELLMER [2003], not WELLMER [1986]; see next footnote.
17 Concerning the need of deliberation and argumentation, for fallible human beings, cf. JOHN 
STUART MILL [1859], chapter II, “Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion”.
18 This is in accordance with main points in WELLMER [1986], pp. 124–131 and 171–172, and 
[1993], p. 175, where he argues for a gradualist approach and for “negative justification” (negative 
Rechtfertigung). Similar points in SKIRBEKK [2002]. Also Kettner, [in:] APEL and KETTNER
(eds) [1992], p. 22: “Der diskursethische Ansatz kritisiert das Bestehende im Lichte regulativer
Ideen. […] Regulative Ideen sind […] Orientierungsinstrumente für die melioristisch-kritische 
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Two points are then decisive: 
(i) Fallibilism is to be conceived as a plural notion, to be illuminated by various 
case-studies.  
In discussing fallibilism Wellmer refers to Wittgensteinian arguments 
from life-world certainties and act-inherent ‘tacit knowing’. I agree. We 
should look into a variety of different cases of more or less fallible 
knowledge and insight:  comprehensive theories, simple statements, 
conceptual frameworks (‘vocabularies’ in Rorty’s terminology), and act-
inherent certainties.19 Moreover, in analyzing act-inherent competences 
and insights we may argue convincingly for necessary preconditions.20
I would go further, arguing for the cautious usage of ‘arguments from 
absurdity’ on a variety of cases in order to reveal different kinds (and 
degrees) of ‘absurdity’, and thereby, reflectively, also to reveal different 
kinds of necessary preconditions. 21
In short, fallibilism should be conceived of as plural, as gradual, and thus we 
should carefully look at different cases. 
(ii) The notion of “regulative ideas” should be conceived melioristically, in 
terms of overcoming less good views and arguments, not in terms of 
a comprehensive final truth.  
Wellmer refers to the importance of considering the question of various 
conceptual frames, or ‘vocabularies’ (referring to Richard Rorty, and 
thereby to Heidegger on ‘world disclosure’, Welterschließung). I agree. 
We should consider the tricky question of (relative) conceptual (in-) 
adequacy, not merely the question of truth (in terms of conceptually 
constituted statements and theories).22 Moreover, we may talk about 
conceptual (in-)adequacy in gradual terms, as more or less adequate or 
Arbeit bestimmter Negation”. Further comments on the Apel-Wellmer controversy [in:] 
SKIRBEKK (ed.) [2004], pp. 7–27.
19 For instance, Darwinism is a fallible scientific theory, but definitely less fallible than 
creationism. And descriptive macro-anatomy of the human body is hardly fallible at all, since we 
know it all – it is no longer a subject for research, but merely a subject for the education of future 
doctors and health personal.
20 Cf. the ‘praxeological’ analysis of Jakob Meløe et al., [in:] SKIRBEKK (ed.) [1983].
21 SKIRBEKK [1993]. For the term ‘arguments from absurdity’, cf. also Gilbert Ryle on informal 
‘reductio ad absurdum arguments’, RYLE [1945].
22 E.g. SKIRBEKK [2012]. To make it brief: all statements in a scientific theory (say, in 
economics) may be well established, within its own conceptual frame, and still the theory may be 
blind for various phenomena within its field of concern (e.g. to the effect that economic theories 
often fail in predicting future events). In short, its conceptual ‘world disclosure’ is (relatively) 
inadequate for coping with important facts.
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inadequate. Hence, to the extent that there is a spill-over between 
conceptual (in-)adequacy and truth-claims, we could even talk about 
gradual truth-claims, about (comprehensive) theories being more or less 
true.23
In short, in discussing fallibilism we should also look at the question of 
conceptual adequacy and inadequacy (and at the possible spill-over to the 
question of propositional and theoretical truth), and in looking at cases of 
relative conceptual adequacy or inadequacy a melioristic perspective should be 
considered (avoiding what is less reasonable). 
A reminder: in transcendental-pragmatics, four speech-act inherent 
validity-claims are paramount in this connection: truth claims, rightness 
claims, claims to truthfulness, and claims to meaningfulness. Briefly 
stated, truth and rightness claims are seen as argumentatively 
(“discursively”) “redeemable” under ideal conditions, characterized by 
“the forceless force of the better argument” and mutual recognition 
among the participants24 – in short, under free and equal conditions for 
all participants, and by a willingness to seek better arguments and to 
listen to each other.25 In transcendental-pragmatics, rightness claims are 
seen as claims for norms of justice and fairness, primarily for the 
regulation of conflicts, not as claims concerning values. Truthfulness 
claims are not seen as discursively redeemable. Such claims are 
“redeemed” by interpersonal experiences among those concerned. 
Moreover, meaningfulness is construed as a precondition of meaningful 
argumentation (and communication), though it may also be related to 
questions of conceptual adequacy or inadequacy. These are the main 
characteristics of the discourse theory of truth and rightness that pertains 
to transcendental-pragmatics (or respectively to “universal” and 
“formal”pragmatics in Habermas). However, there are various critical 
remarks to this conception of four validity claims, for instance: (i) There 
are arguments in favor of further differentiations, e.g. between truth 
claims of singular statements and truth claims of comprehensive 
theories, and also between these truth claims and claims of (relative) 
conceptual adequacy.26 (ii) Simultaneously there are arguments in favor 
of transitions between various validity claims, e.g. between theoretical 
23 SKIRBEKK [2003].
24 Personal autonomy (Mündigkeit) is not an empirical fact; it is a task (for each individual and
also for society), and in that sense it is a regulative idea. This is a point with practical implications, 
though often overlooked in political theory. Cf. SKIRBEKK [2011], pp. 183–185.  
25 Similar points, e.g. J. S. MILL [1859] and TRANØY [1976].
26 WELLMER [1986], p. 168, SKIRBEKK [2003] and [2012], pp. 73 f.
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truth claims and conceptual adequacy claims, and also between 
conceptual adequacy claims and value questions.27 (iii) Thus, there are 
arguments in favor of the view that the relative conceptual adequacy of 
“situation descriptions” is decisive for normative (moral and ethics) 
validity claims.28
3. New constellations – institutionally, politically, intellectually
At first, some brief remarks on institutional changes: In academia we have had 
an increasing specialization and fragmentation, also within philosophy. Due to 
the Bologna reforms of European universities, time schedules for the humanities 
have been shortened and various disciplines are cut up into smaller units. 
Publishing houses, also those that are named university press, are increasingly
commercialized, focusing on textbooks and light literature, rather than 
professional philosophy. These trends are bad news for philosophy, not least for 
transcendental-pragmatics, conceived as a comprehensive project, requiring 
discursive and self-reflective reasoning and a broad knowledge of opposing 
philosophical positions and of modern science-based societies.   
As to changes on the intellectual level, I shall recall a few points: After World 
War Two, positivism was a philosophically well-articulated position and an 
easily recognized target for criticism. Today the situation is more diversified and 
amorphous. Modes of thinking reminiscent of positivism are certainly still 
around, but often embedded in implicit attitudes and suppositions within highly 
specialized disciplines and professions, such as neuroscience and biology, or 
economics and political science, professions that often disregard epistemic 
questions of a self-referential nature and questions of normative justification. 
Hence, in order to articulate a philosophical criticism that those concerned in 
these fields of research cannot ignore, it is decisive to be well informed about 
what is going on in these sciences and professions and to articulate one’s 
criticism in a language and in a way that is seen as relevant and important for 
those who are the addressees of this kind of criticism. Arguing in general terms 
for a supposedly superior philosophical counter position will not be seen as 
convincing. In order to be relevant, such criticism has to be specific and 
inherently situated in the disciplines and professions that are its target. 
27 E.g. SKIRBEKK [2012].
28 WELLMER [1986], e.g. pp. 125, 134–5. In SKIRBEKK [2003] and [2012] questions of 
conceptual adequacy and of different “situation descriptions” are related to the plurality of
scientific and scholarly perspectives, whereas Wellmer tends to refer to socio-cultural cases such 
as the fight for a revision of the “description” of women, children and homosexuals, see 
WELLMER ibid., p. 125. 
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Today, existentialism is no longer a dominant position. But again, there is 
a variety of disciplines and professions that incorporate similar epistemic and 
normative shortcomings as did existentialism in the post-war era, such as ethical 
decisionism and cultural relativism with a disregard for argumentative and self-
critically reflexive reasoning. For instance, within the humanities and social 
sciences, and related professions, there are various versions of contextualism, 
deconstructivism and post-modernism, each with a disregard or even an explicit 
rejection of self-critically reflexive argumentation in the search for truth and 
universal validity, seen as eurocentrism or logocentrism, and for these presumed 
flaws “Western Enlightenment” is blamed. For instance, there are strands within 
“cultural studies” that are uncritically inspired by Foucault and (so-called) 
“French theory”. There are strands in political multiculturalism and in academic 
postcolonial studies that are reminiscent of former leftist criticism of class-
suppression and power in disguise, often without arguments for legitimate and 
universal principles, in opposition to illegitimate and contextual ones.  
In short, the intellectual situation has become more opaque and amorphous, 
more difficult for the kind of criticism that transcendental-pragmatics articulates.  
The same holds true for the general mood and basic political challenges: No 
more the predominant post-war front against the atrocities of the Nazi regime 
and its neglect of normative universality and self-critical argumentation. No 
more the cold war and the fight against Soviet totalitarianism. No more the 
politically motivating reactions against American warfare in Vietnam. Today, 
the situation is less clear. How should the main challenges be conceived? Is 
capitalism the main challenge? Or is modern technology the core of our 
problems, with its unprecedented and detrimental potentials? And what about 
politicized religion and premodern cultures, well equipped with modern 
technology and weaponry? What about new and increased differences between 
rich and poor? And what about environmentally unsustainable consumption and 
reproduction? 
In short, after the Second World War the role and importance of the ideas 
brought forward by the emerging transcendental-pragmatics were easily 
recognizable, at least for an enlightened audience, against the backdrop of 
positivism, existentialism, and Nazism. Today the overall intellectual and 
political situation has changed. Even where transcendental-pragmatic 
philosophers argue convincingly for the philosophical strength of their mode of 
thinking, they are no more within an intellectual and political constellation 
where these ideas are easily recognized as relevant and important for a broader 
audience. 
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4. The philosophical importance and practical relevance
I shall briefly sum up what I see as the philosophical importance and practical 
relevance of a revised transcendental-pragmatics, under new institutional and 
intellectual constellations.29 Here it comes:  
Transcendental-pragmatics represents a resource for defending claims to 
universal validity for basic norms as well as for validity-claims in general. The 
clue consists in self-reflective arguments concerning act and speech-act inherent 
preconditions. In a pluralistic world, with a need to overcome “the fight of gods” 
(Max Weber), this is a decisive contribution. Even so, transcendental-pragmatics 
should be conceived cautiously and melioristically, with an awareness of 
nuances and differences, also for the main cases of self-reflective arguments.30
In addition to strict self-reflection, as in the transcendental-pragmatics of Karl-
Otto Apel, there are also self-referential arguments in a broader sense, as in 
“arguments from absurdity”, applied on contextual inconsistencies and category 
mistakes.31 Hence, there are transitions from the self-reflective core of 
transcendental-pragmatics to melioristically conceived precondition-analyses in 
a broader sense – e.g. concerning specific conceptual usages and perspectives, 
be it in various scientific and scholarly disciplines or in world views and 
“comprehensive doctrines” (Rawls).
Moreover, transcendental-pragmatics, when conceived cautiously and melio-
ristically, supports and protects a discursive culture and an awareness of 
different types of rationality and reasonableness. In a pluralistic and precarious 
world, this is an important contribution. In this respect, transcendental-
pragmatics represents a defense of a post-skeptical and self-critical 
enlightenment.  
At the same time, transcendental-pragmatic thinkers ought to recognize and 
relate themselves to the considerable changes that have occurred within their 
institutional and intellectual setting. To my mind, the following revisionary steps 
ought to be undertaken:  
Argumentative virtues of classical analytic philosophy should to a larger degree 
be incorporated into the mood and mode of thinking among transcendental-
pragmatic philosophers.32
29 Cf. ”The Modernity Debate: Rationality – Universal and Plural?”, [in:] SKIRBEKK [2007]. 
German version in BURCKHART and GRONKE (eds), [2002].
30 Cf. SKIRBEKK [2002].
31 Ibid. Also, RYLE [1945].
32 There should be less sweeping overviews and careless usage of comprehensive concepts on 
a high level of abstraction, such as the crude dichotomy between man and nature (in Habermas), 
criticized, [in:] SKIRBEKK [2012], pp. 57–72, or between man and animal, ibid. pp. 191–214.
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Hence, we should more openly recognize and investigate the epistemic variety 
of what we conceive of as transcendental preconditions for valid thinking and 
argumentation. 
Moreover, we should investigate the variety of basic preconditions inherent in 
various activities and professions in modern institutionally differentiated and 
science-based societies. In so doing, we should also investigate in which sense 
there are gradual transitions between philosophical reasoning and discussions in 
the public sphere, and between philosophical insights on the one hand and 
everyday actions and science-based activities on the other.33
To the extent that such requirements are fulfilled, this revised transcendental-
pragmatic philosophy could probably play a positive role by fostering and 
strengthening a self-critical and self-conscious enlightenment in academic life, 
in public opinion-formation, and in politics in general.  
However, we should recall that philosophy is more than transcendental-
pragmatics, even when the latter is revised and extended beyond the hard core of 
strict reflection on the primordial situation of argumentation.34 In philosophy, 
there is one focus on truth, on validity-claims and argumentative redemption, but 
there is another focus on conceptual creativity and originality (on “world 
disclosure”, Welterschließung, in Heidegger's terminology). In philosophy, and 
in life in general, both are needed. 
There are urgent questions facing our world today. These challenges are utterly 
complex, and to a large degree beyond the scope of transcendental-pragmatics. 
Nevertheless, a reasonably revised transcendental-pragmatics has a role to play 
in an ongoing and case-oriented critique of science and rationality, and in the 
critique of religion,35 not least of the three monotheistic world religions with 
their inherent validity-claims for their specific notions of god and their 
interpretations of sacred scriptures. In this sense, transcendental-pragmatics 
could contribute to a moderating “modernization of consciousness”.36
33 When investigating the various specific or general preconditions for different societal and 
scientific activities, the investigators ought to be knowledgeable about what is going on in the field 
under investigation, be it in physics or social science. In this sense, they ought to have a “double 
competence”.
34 “Strikte Reflexion”, in Wolfgang Kuhlmann’s terms, cf. KUHLMANN [1993], p. 230. 
“Primordialer Diskurs”, in Karl-Otto Apel’s terms, cf. APEL[1998], pp. 794–797.
35 Critique in the Kantian sense of purification, not rejection. As to critique of religion, cf. ROHS 
[2013].
36 Cf. HABERMAS [2005], pp. 143 ff. In brief: (i) a recognition of the pluralism of 
‘comprehensive doctrines’ (cf. also ‘reasonable disagreement’ in Rawls), (ii) a recognition 
of scientific and scholarly insights and discursive procedures, and (iii) a recognition of institutional 
differentiations, e.g. between law and religion, and about professional roles and private life. 
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Moreover, by furthering a dialogue between cultures, based on mutual 
recognition and a search for better understanding and better reasons – in contrast 
to unilateral and condescending preaching – the ideas and ideals of 
transcendental-pragmatics do have an important role to play in our contemporary 
and complex world. 
In short, new civilizational crises may emerge. Dependent on form and 
extension, many things will then be required, but also this: A defence 
of universally valid normative principles, across cultures and material interests. 
A defence of Enlightenment, as a project with an on-going strengthening of 
personal autonomy, against ignorance and narrowness. A defence of serious 
discussions and open dialogues, across conflicting positions.
Hence, there is hardly any reason to assume that transcendental-pragmatics will 
lose its relevance in times to come. Presumably, it is rather the other way round.  
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Moreover, by furthering a dialogue between cultures, based on mutual 
recognition and a search for better understanding and better reasons – in contrast 
to unilateral and condescending preaching – the ideas and ideals of 
transcendental-pragmatics do have an important role to play in our contemporary 
and complex world. 
In short, new civilizational crises may emerge. Dependent on form and 
extension, many things will then be required, but also this: A defence 
of universally valid normative principles, across cultures and material interests. 
A defence of Enlightenment, as a project with an on-going strengthening of 
personal autonomy, against ignorance and narrowness. A defence of serious 
discussions and open dialogues, across conflicting positions.
Hence, there is hardly any reason to assume that transcendental-pragmatics will 
lose its relevance in times to come. Presumably, it is rather the other way round.  
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PHILOSOPHY AS THE FOUNDATION OF KNOWLEDGE, ACTION AND ETHOS 
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IS TADEUSZ KOTARBIŃSKI’S INDEPENDENT ETHICS 
PROGRAM IMPORTANT NOWADAYS? 
Abstract. In the paper, the essential elements of Kotarbiński’s independent ethics are presented. 
These are ethics which are  one example of ethics in the broader sense, with a range of problems 
related to the question: how should we live our lives? Kotarbiński proposed an idea of independent 
ethics, ethics that are independent of religion and philosophy, ethics based on “platitude 
(obviousness) of heart”. In the paper, some shortcomings of this proposal will be shown, but also, 
by analysis of the parable of the Good Samaritan, it will be shown how we can overcome the 
weaknesses of independent ethic theory. 
Keywords. Independent ethics, obviousness of heart, conscience, dignity, anthropology, Christian 
Revelation. 
Professor Tadeusz Kotarbiński, the first Rector of the University of Łódź, left 
a significant mark of his rich and creative personality in many areas of the 
humanities, especially so in philosophy. One of these areas is ethics, and one of 
his original ideas was the concept of independent ethics. The idea of such an 
ethics he presented as far back as 1948, then returned repeatedly to it – up until 
1987. Initially, the idea was met with quite lively resonance among 
philosophers, and some took it up, sometimes critically, but approving the 
general thrust of independent ethics.1 Later, however, from approximately 1970, 
interest in it waned. Below I shall first present the important elements of this 
concept, then try to show some of its weaknesses, which – perhaps – have 
1 Cf. esp.: A. Grzegorczyk, On foundations of natural ethics, [in:] idem, Diagrams and Man. 
Philosophical Essays, Kraków 1963, pp. 166–184; T. Czeżowski, On Tadeusz Kotarbiński’s 
independent ethics, Philosophical Studies 1976 No. 3, pp. 27–32; T. Styczeń, Independent Ethics?,
Lublin 1980 (cf. esp. pp. 59–63). Each of these authors in a slightly different way included the 
proposal by Kotarbiński in their own ethical suggestions. Noteworthy is particularly Czeżowski, 
whose conception of ethics as an empirical science, published at the same time, comes especially 
close to Kotarbiński’s idea of independent ethics. Cf.: T. Czeżowski, Ethics as an empirical 
science, Philosopher’s Quarterly 1949, vol. 18. 2, pp. 161–171. Cf. Also: A. Szostek, Ethics as an 
empirical science as presented by T. Czeżowski and Kotarbiński, KUL Annals of Philosophy 1971, 
vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 43–57.
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